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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3013 
___________ 
 
  AAMCO TRANSMISSIONS, INC.   
 
v. 
 
JAMES M. DUNLAP, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-04009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 1, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 This is an appeal from an order of the District Court granting Appellee AAMCO 
Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO) a permanent injunction against Appellant James M. 
Dunlap.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 The present case is part of a continuing dispute between Dunlap and AAMCO.  In 
1981, AAMCO and Dunlap entered into a franchise agreement which permitted Dunlap 
to operate a transmission repair center in Chesapeake, Virginia under the AAMCO name.  
The franchise agreement lasted for an initial term of fifteen years, with automatic renewal 
for another fifteen years if neither party gave written notice of termination.  In 1988, the 
franchise agreement was amended to include, among other things, an enforceable 
arbitration agreement.  In 1996, AAMCO permitted the franchise agreement to renew per 
its terms for an additional fifteen-year period, expiring in June 2011. 
 After the franchise agreement expired, Dunlap continued to operate his repair 
center using the AAMCO name.  As a result, AAMCO filed in the District Court a 
lawsuit against Dunlap for trademark infringement.  At that time, AAMCO also filed a 
motion for preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit Dunlap from holding himself out as 
an AAMCO franchisee or using AAMCO trademarks or signage.  Dunlap disputed that 
the franchise agreement had ended in June 2011, arguing that intervening circumstances 
caused the agreement to end at a later date. 
 After discovery and a hearing, the District Court issued an order in August 2011 
granting AAMCO’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Court concluded that 
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AAMCO had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the 
franchise agreement had ended in June 2011; irreparable injury in the event its injunction 
request was denied; greater hardship in the absence of an injunction than Dunlap would 
suffer with one; and a public interest in precluding Dunlap from confusing customers and 
requiring him to live up to the terms of the parties’ agreement.  See P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. 
Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 508 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(setting forth the requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction).  The District 
Court also required AAMCO to post an injunction bond in the amount of $100,000.  
Finally, the District Court stayed the litigation because the parties’ dispute was subject to 
mandatory arbitration.  Dunlap did not appeal the District Court’s order. 
 Thereafter, in December 2013, an arbitrator ruled in favor of AAMCO, concluding 
that the franchise agreement had, in fact, expired on June 5, 2011.  Dunlap did not appeal 
the arbitration order, which was binding on the parties.  In March 2015, upon belief that 
Dunlap might seek to continue to hold himself out as an AAMCO franchisee at his 
Chesapeake, Virginia repair shop, AAMCO filed in the District Court a motion to convert 
the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction and to exonerate the injunction 
bond.   
 The District Court, after holding a hearing, granted the motion.  In its analysis, the 
Court considered the factors necessary to grant a permanent injunction—whether “(1) the 
moving party has shown actual success on the merits; (2) the moving party will be 
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irreparably injured by the denial of injunctive relief; (3) the granting of the permanent 
injunction will result in even greater harm to the defendant; and (4) the injunction would 
be in the public interest.”  Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 Regarding the first factor, the District Court determined that AAMCO successfully 
demonstrated that it had already succeeded on the merits of its claim that the franchise 
agreement ended in June 2011, and that Dunlap did not dispute that the arbitrator’s 
decision was binding and could not be re-litigated.  As to the second factor, the Court 
determined that AAMCO had shown that it would be irreparably injured absent the 
injunction.  In particular, the Court determined that to the extent that customers might be 
dissatisfied with Dunlap’s performance at his repair shop, AAMCO might suffer a loss of 
its business reputation and goodwill if Dunlap failed to cure his deficiencies.   
 With regard to the third factor, the Court determined that a permanent injunction 
would do Dunlap no harm.  AAMCO simply requested that Dunlap be prohibited from 
holding himself out as an AAMCO franchisee or using AAMCO’s trademarks.  Given the 
arbitrator’s ruling that the franchise agreement ended nearly five years ago, the District 
Court determined that a permanent injunction would merely prohibit Dunlap from 
engaging in activity to which he has no legal right.  Finally, the District Court determined 
that a permanent injunction would be in the public interest in that it would prevent 
confusion and deception among business customers regarding whether Dunlap’s repair 
shop is, in fact, an approved AAMCO franchise.   
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 Dunlap appeals the District Court’s decision.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, and review a District Court’s grant or denial of an injunction for abuse of 
discretion.  See NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 
2011).  “An abuse of discretion occurs when the District Court’s decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application 
of law to fact.”  Id. at 475-76 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We do not 
interfere with a district court’s discretionary judgments, unless it clearly erred in 
weighing the relevant factors and reaching a conclusion.”  Id. at 476. 
  For essentially the reasons given by the District Court, we conclude that it did not 
abuse its discretion in granting AAMCO’s motion.  Dunlap, in his pro se brief, sets forth 
a number of challenges, but many of them are facially meritless or irrelevant to the 
District Court’s grant of the permanent injunction.  That notwithstanding and given our 
narrow scope of review, we conclude, based on a careful reading of the record and a fair 
evaluation of the District Court’s analysis, that the Court did not abuse its discretion in 
balancing the factors and issuing the permanent injunction.1                                                                                                               
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
1 Given that disposition, we also perceive no error on the part of the District Court in 
exonerating the injunction bond. 
